

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 153 907

SC 010 845

AUTHOR Aoki, Ted, Ed.
 TITLE Curriculum Evaluation in a New Key. Monograph Series, Number 1.
 INSTITUTION British Columbia Univ., Vancouver. Faculty of Education.
 PUB DATE 78
 NOTE 62p.; A compilation of four papers presented at the College and University Faculty Association (CUFA) Symposium at the Annual Meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies (Cincinnati, Ohio, November 23-26, 1977)
 AVAILABLE FROM Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction, Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1W5, Canada (\$3.00, paper cover)
 EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.83 Plus Postage. HC Not Available from EDRS.
 DESCRIPTORS Classroom Environment; Conceptual Schemes; Curriculum Design; Curriculum Development; *Curriculum Evaluation; Curriculum Planning; Curriculum Problems; Curriculum Research; Educational Development; Educational Improvement; Educational Innovation; Educational Sociology; Elementary Secondary Education; Existentialism; Models; *Relevance (Education); Social Sciences; *Social Studies

ABSTRACT

This paper presents some alternative approaches to conventional curriculum evaluation (such as survey questionnaires and test instruments); it is divided into four chapters. Chapter I is a brief introduction to the paper and offers some new conceptions for evaluation in social studies. Chapter II outlines three perspectives which might be considered in evaluative activities: first, an evaluator may analyze and judge the methods used in a program on how well they help educators achieve goals; second, an evaluator may focus on the perceptions which participants (students, teachers, parents, and administrators) have of a program; and third, an evaluator may focus on the foundations of a program, including its underlying values, assumptions, and the worth of its goals. Chapter III outlines a method of evaluation which is attentive to the meanings teachers and students bring to the classroom; each person in the classroom responds to things, events, ideas, other persons, and groups in many ways and assigns a variety of meanings. Chapter IV discusses four different evaluation paradigms that vary with the viewpoint of the evaluator. Each of the viewpoints is discussed in terms of three aspects: goal of research, mode of understanding, and method(s) of research. Bibliographies for each chapter are included. (Author/JK)

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CURRICULUM EVALUATION IN A NEW KEY

Monograph Series, Number 1.

Ted Aoki, Editor

Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction
Faculty of Education,
University of British Columbia,
Vancouver B.C. V6T 1W5

- 1978 -

54 010 845

Number 1

MONOGRAPH SERIES

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The Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction

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CHAPTER I

TOWARD NEW CONCEPTIONS FOR EVALUATION IN SOCIAL STUDIES¹

Ted T. Aoki

Social Studies has an identity crisis. More than most disciplines, Social Studies has struggled with what it is - or what they are; for part of its confusion is whether it is one thing or many.²

- Howard Mehlinger
President of N.C.S.S.

Mehlinger's remark that the Social Studies is (are?) confronting a state of crisis is equally applicable to evaluation in Social Studies. The symposium papers included in this monograph have emerged from our conviction that the conventional approach to evaluation in Social Studies has been confined to a narrow focus, couched in the technical language of ends and means. That language is familiar to most of us. It is the language of the operational statement of instructional objectives--behavioural objectives, performance objectives, testable objectives, criterion objectives and the like. It is the language of measurement of achievement in terms of these "specific" objectives, and of analyses in terms of discrepancy between ends sought and achievement attained. This approach characterizes the currently fashionable accountability and assessment movement in the United States and in Canada.

CONCEPTUALLY SPEAKING

It is only recently that there has been any serious questioning of the orientation underlying Social Studies traditions in research. In this questioning two recent papers deserve comment. The first of these is the appearance in 1973 of "Research on Teaching Social Studies",³ a probing

¹ Presented at the CUFA (College and University Faculty Association) Symposium, Annual Conference of the National Council for the Social Studies, Cincinnati, Ohio, November 1977. We acknowledge the valuable questions and criticisms given to these papers by Dr. Benjamin Cox, Chairman of Department of Secondary Education, The University of Illinois (Urbana).

² H. Mehlinger. "Foreword." R. Barr, J. Barth, S. Shermis. Defining the Social Studies. Washington: N.C.S.S., 1977.

³ J. Shaver and G. Larkins, "Research on Teaching Social Studies". In R. M. W. Travers (Ed.), Second Handbook of Research on Teaching. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1973.

article by James Shaver and Guy Larkins. Concerned with the confining nature of the traditional approach to research in Social Studies, they urged extension of the basic research frame, calling for a "broader view" which included the use of ethnography, an anthropological methodology, as a potential research approach in Social Studies. We believe that Shaver and Larkins' contribution lies primarily both in their recognition of the restrictive confinement of traditional Social Studies research and in their call for a "broader view" of research.

The second significant event is the appearance of a critical comment by Max van Manen who, in an article entitled "An Exploration of Alternative Research Orientation in Social Education",⁴ concurred with Shaver and Larkins that there is a narrow tunnel vision effect in traditional curricular research approaches to Social Studies. Responding to their call for the broadening of the research base, van Manen agreed with Shaver and Larkins in the efficacy of the socio-anthropological approach for enlarging the Social Studies research frame, but he did question whether such an extension really represented or accommodated a fundamentally different research orientation to Social Studies.

In exploring alternative research paradigms, van Manen recommended the works of scholars in the Frankfurt School whose Continental European scholarship is somewhat alien to the thought-style represented in North American mainstream research. Notable among these scholars is the work of Jurgen Habermas⁵ whose three basic orientations put forward in Knowledge and Human Interests have been aptly described, and their relevance to Social Studies research explored, by van Manen. These three orientations are:

1. The Empirical-Analytic
2. The Interpretative (Hermeneutic)
3. The Critical Theoretic

A premise of the papers in this monograph is that the Habermasian tri-paradigmatic framework provides alternative research orientations, not only for research, but also for curriculum development and curriculum evaluation. We view each of the three as a root metaphor which helps us to disclose approaches to curriculum development, curriculum evaluation and curriculum research. In "Evaluation: Sense-Making of School Programs", Walter Werner, interpreting these paradigms as ways of making sense, analyses the major characteristics of three sense-making ways, and elaborates what each has to offer to curriculum evaluation. In "Existential Phenomenology as a Dimension of Evaluation", Peter Rothe, concerned with meanings teachers and students give to the Social Studies classroom situation, describes the

⁴ M. J. Max van Manen, "An Exploration of Alternative Research Orientation in Social Education". In N.C.S.S., Theory and Research in Social Education, Vol. III, No. 1, Dec. 1975.

⁵ Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.


relevance of existential phenomenology to evaluation. His exploration of the meaning-quality which teachers and students give to situations is, we believe, a novel thrust in the dimension of evaluation. In the article entitled, "Emic-Evaluative Inquiry as an Approach for Evaluating School Programs", Donald C. Wilson discusses different evaluation paradigms that vary with the viewpoint the evaluator holds towards the social world of the classroom. Using an anthropological framework, he presents 'etic' and 'emic' frames that illuminate the kind of concerns and approaches we may take in evaluation.

EXPERIENTIALLY SPEAKING

The reader will find that the papers included in this monograph are conceptual. But all the authors speak from their concrete, practical experiences in three major evaluations of Social Studies. These three province-wide evaluation activities took place in Western Canada, two conducted for the Department of Education in the Province of Alberta, and one for the Ministry of Education in the Province of British Columbia. They are as follows:

1. L. Downey et al, A Report of An Assessment: The Alberta Social Studies - 1975. (Department of Education, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada).
2. T. Aoki et al, The British Columbia Social Studies Assessment - 1978. (Six Reports to the Ministry of Education, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada).
3. D. Massey and W. Werner, Alberta Education, Mutualism and the Canadian Content Project and Canadian Content Kits: A Report of an Assessment - 1977. (Department of Education, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada).

In these assessments all three of the Habermas orientations mentioned were assumed in the conduct of evaluative activities. The following diagram, which refers to six sub-reports of The British Columbia Social Studies Assessment - 1978, illustrates our attempts to give consideration to the three evaluation orientations mentioned earlier:



F. "An Interpretation of Intents of the Elementary and Secondary Curriculum Guides." (In B.C. Social Studies Assessment: A Summary Report - 1978)

Examination of the diagram shows the dominance in this particular evaluation of empirical-analytic techniques such as survey questionnaires, test instruments, interview schedules - a telling comment on the strength of this orientation in conducting this evaluation. Nonetheless, the inclusion in our endeavours of situational interpretative studies and the critical theoretic study underscores our assumption that alternative evaluation paradigms are also needed.

No program can ever be evaluated in its entirety. But we can increase our vision of whatever we are viewing through the employment of as many perspectives as we can find appropriate and utilize for our purposes. Through our experiences with school programs we have had to wrestle with both conceptual and empirical issues in various perspectives on evaluation. The chapters that follow reflect, we hope, our ventures into alternative evaluation paradigms.


Chapter II

EVALUATION: SENSE-MAKING OF SCHOOL PROGRAMS*

Walter Werner

I start from the premise that evaluation is a "sense-making" or interpretive activity. It is a task in which the evaluator interprets educational situations and programs from some perspective. He must select, classify, and define 'data' upon which he makes his judgments. The data generated are products of the assumptions, beliefs, interests, and approaches he holds implicitly or explicitly. As such, his 'evaluation report' is colored and moulded by the initial perspective used for interpreting and defining his experience of a school program.

Different kinds of sense can be made of a program or situation depending upon the frame of reference which the evaluator brings to his task of "sense-making." Indeed, the literature of curriculum evaluation provides a wide array of theoretical/methodological perspectives. In the first place, many authors have a perspective which conceives evaluation as judging the relationship between the means and the ends of a program. This perspective of evaluation not only dominates the literature but also is associated with sophisticated models for guiding research. Second, other authors hold perspectives which conceive evaluation as judging the entire context of a program. The context includes the perceptions of people, as well as the situational factors giving a program its particular meaning and relevance. Third, a number of perspectives which are gaining visibility in educational literature can be referred to as critical. From a critical stance, evaluators conceive their task as judging the foundational assumptions, hidden values, and implications of a program. As yet, the methods of a critical approach are not as explicitly defined as they are in ends-means evaluation.



Major Perspectives for Interpreting Programs

*Paper presented at a CUFA Symposium, the Annual Conference of the National Council for the Social Studies, Cincinnati, Ohio, November 25, 1977.

My purpose in this chapter is to outline these three general perspectives which might be considered when we make sense of programs in evaluation activities. (1) Ends-means "sense-making," (2) situational "sense-making," and (3) critical "sense-making" are not to be thought of as competing ways to understand programs. Each perspective allows us to understand different aspects of a program. As such, I do not argue in this paper for the use of any one perspective alone, but for the combined use of all three in program evaluation. Since school programs can be interpreted from many points of view, the more outlooks we bring to a program the broader the picture which emerges for us.

A comment on the background of this chapter may be helpful to the reader. These ideas have been developed in part from our experience in three evaluation projects.¹ The first project was an evaluation of the Alberta Social Studies Program (1975); the second was an evaluation of the Alberta Canadian Studies Program (1977); and the third was an evaluation of the British Columbia Social Studies Program (1977). Each of these projects was conducted under contract with the appropriate provincial Department of Education. Though an ends-means perspective was central to all three of these projects, we attempted also to integrate situational and critical perspectives.

PART A: ENDS-MEANS SENSE-MAKING OF PROGRAMS

The technological orientation to curriculum is one that is preoccupied with the development of means to achieve prespecified ends. Those working from this orientation tend to view schooling as a complex system that can be analyzed into its constituent components. The problem for the educator or educational technologist is to bring the system under control so that the goals it seeks to attain can be achieved (Eisner and Vallance, 1974:49).

¹These three evaluations are summarized in the following reports:
L.W. Downey Research Associates Ltd. The Social Studies in Alberta. A Report of an Assessment. Edmonton: Alberta Education, 1975.
D. Massey and W. Werner. Alberta Education, Mutualism, and The Canadian Content Project and Canadian Content Kits. A Report of an Assessment. Edmonton: Alberta Education, 1977.
T. Aoki, et al. The British Columbia Social Studies Assessment. Victoria: British Columbia Ministry of Education, 1977.

Evaluation activities may be viewed as an end-means interpretation of programs. Concern is here focussed on the relation of the means (teaching methods, student activities, materials, resources) to the ends (intended objectives and outcomes). As such, the nature of this relationship between ends and means is the basis for evaluating programs. Some of the (1) aims, (2) assumptions, and (3) tasks of ends-means interpretation are examined briefly in the following sections.

Some Aims of Ends-Means Interpretation

Ends-means thinking is not only based upon, but also serves certain values and goals. An exemplar is a Macdonald's hamburger stand. The entire system is based upon the values of control, certainty, efficiency, precision, cost effectiveness, predictability, standardization and speed. These values define the relationship of the means (e.g., production of hamburgers) to the ends (e.g., increase in number of sales). When an evaluator analyzes this system, discrepancies between actual and intended outcomes provide him a basis for diagnosing deficiencies in the system and for prescribing compensatory activities. The outcome of the evaluation is improved effectiveness (efficiency, predictability, certainty, etc.) in achieving the prespecified goals of the system.

In a similar manner, an evaluator's attempt to interpret school programs in terms of ends-means models focuses him in a particular way. He may view students as being processed like 'Big Macs' in terms of the program's prespecified standards and outcomes, and since he attempts to make these outcomes predictable and certain, the business of 'learning' may be seen in terms of efficiency. As with 'Big Macs,' increased numerical scores indicate success in a program, whether these scores represent hamburger sales or pupil-learning outcomes. Student testing allows the evaluator to judge the means used in a program and to prescribe changes for streamlining the program. As such, evaluation methodology becomes primarily a matter of measuring the degree of discrepancy between actual and desired outcomes.

The notion of what constitutes a 'problem' within the system (i.e., a hamburger stand or a school program) tends to be defined in terms of the gap between what is perceived as 'actual' and 'ideal.' The larger the gap, the greater the problem. Usually the ideal is accepted as given: the goals of a system stated as desirable performance outcomes. The task of evaluation becomes the measurement of goal achievement in order to make judgments about the system's efficiency and cost effectiveness as well as to increase the certainty and predictability of achieving the prespecified outcomes. Emphasis is upon increasing control of the entire system, and the data deemed relevant for this sense-making are those which specify and enhance the degree of control within the system. Other data are either irrelevant, secondary, or else merely interesting. This way of thinking about a 'problem' has made ends-means evaluation largely a technical task.

Preoccupation with technique in evaluation is to be expected because

our everyday activities tend to be dominated by techniques. So pervasive are techniques that their application in part makes our daily life possible. As we share them with other actors, daily life runs smoothly and without incident. Together we follow formula and means on the belief that if we do this or that, then we can expect typical outcomes with confidence. When technique is followed successfully, we bring certainty and efficiency into our activities. We usually do not question the why or the how of the technique we use. In wanting to telephone a friend, it is enough for me to know the formula for achieving my goal. I do not have to know how the phone works, but only how to use it as a means to my end.

The obvious success of technique in applied engineering and the technical trades has made it appealing to the program evaluator. Consequently, many of our ends-means models used in evaluation are 'borrowed' from general systems theory, cybernetic engineering, and industrial management. When applied, technique allows the evaluator to enhance certainty in predicting outcomes with greater efficiency, precision, and speed. It is not surprising, therefore, that much of the official wisdom guiding evaluation sense-making is based upon ends-means modes of understanding situations. We need hardly mention that Tyler's rationale is still the major view of program development and evaluation, that models which guide educational research remain for the most part statistical, that behavioral objectives are used extensively as criteria for selecting and organizing knowledge and for assessing program outcomes, and that students and classroom activities are often observed and described in terms of standardized checklists of various kinds. Major focus of many educators tends to be upon means (whether procedures, methods, treatments, remedial activities, hardware) in pursuing prespecified ends. Consequently, program evaluation may be reduced to the adjusting of means for the efficient achievement of predictable ends. These tasks become that of efficient problem solving, and the "correct" solution may be judged on the basis of cost effectiveness, efficiency of implementation, and certainty of predictable outcome. When our interest remains primarily with the means of solution, little attention may be given to the contexts of the problem, to whose interests the solutions serve, or to the values and ethics upon which decisions are made. Numbers may become important because they are easier to control and manipulate than are arguments, reasons, meanings, justifications, and other "messy" aspects of school programs.

A caution is in order because when technique is applied uncritically in evaluating programs, the aims of evaluation may be shaped by the method. In other words, the evaluator's goals may be made to fit the particular means he has. Everything is then at the service of the hardware or the procedure. To illustrate, he may be concerned only with the goals of a program which are precise and measurable; he may define "learning" as specific performance outcomes; he may see effectiveness in terms of increased achievement scores or saved time; he may equate rationality with efficiency. His focus in evaluation may be shifted to the technique rather than the purpose to which it may be applied. In evaluation, consequently, the problem is made to fit the research design rather than the other way around.² The design may be forced upon phenomena

² Abraham Kaplan discusses this difficulty which may be encountered when a researcher selects his techniques.

without much regard for appropriateness, and those aspects of the phenomena which are not amenable to the formula may not be considered significant.

Some Assumptions of Ends-Means Interpretation

Assumptions about (a) programs, (b) worth, and (c) appropriate social relations underlie ends-means interpretation in evaluation.

(a) Implied View of Programs:

When an evaluator interprets a program through an ends-means scheme, he assumes that a program is defined essentially as a statement of intended goals together with methods for goal achievement. It must be stated, though, that there are several disadvantages associated with restricting evaluation to just an ends-means definition of school programs.

Definitions and methods often restrict what an evaluator sees in a situation. For example, forced choice questionnaires, discrepancy models, performance outcome measures, precise research designs, and narrow operational definitions may severely limit the type of data deemed relevant by the evaluator in his sense-making. Interestingly, it can be suggested that sometimes evaluators restrict themselves to "archeology by choice."³ An archeologist has limited data available to him from which to reconstruct the life of some ancient buried city. But this limitation is not by choice. The broken artifacts, partial fireplaces, and bits of material culture are all that he has at hand for making sense of another people separated from him by time. He must make his description and judgments on very limited data, but it is all that he has. On the other hand, the evaluator of a program has the living situation "in-front-of-him," as it were. The people, the classrooms, and the many sources of data are there to be used. His sources and data are virtually unlimited as compared to the archeologist. Therefore, if the evaluator restricts himself to a narrow view of programs, it is by choice, and such choices certainly need to be justified.

Data collected in terms of ends-means definitions may have little resemblance or relation to the social situation they are meant to describe. Data are translated into second-order descriptions which tend to be highly formalized. These second-order descriptions include mathematical idealizations provided by narrow statistical hypotheses of probabilities and correlations, cybernetic idealizations selected from behavioral psychology or engineering metaphors, or generalizations provided by charts, tables, and graphs. All of these second-order typifications are once removed from the first-order descriptions of those who live within the situation defined as a

³ The example was suggested from a conversation with Dr. Turner, Department of Sociology, The University of British Columbia, September, 1977.

school program. The uniqueness, messiness, uncertainty, and rough edges encountered in any study of social situations tend to be reduced to statistics. However, fundamental questions need to be raised about the relationship between these formalized second-order descriptions and the school situations they purport to represent. What is the connection? Why is the 'real' world of the classroom abandoned and the 'theoretical' world of the second-order schemes embraced? In order to understand a program, is it necessary to transform the classroom situation into, for example, inputs, outputs, blackboxes, feedback loops, conditions of homeostasis, and numerical charts? Does the language of computers and engineering provide a more adequate understanding and description of the classroom program? The evaluator seems to abandon the situation he wants to describe and evaluate, in favour of another situation represented by the second-order models he uses.

(b) Implied View of Worth:

In one way or another evaluation is designed to judge the 'worth' of a program. Depending upon the definition of what constitutes a program, the criterion of worth may differ.

When defining a program as ends-means relations, an evaluator makes judgments regarding how well the means are contributing to the specified outcomes. For example, he may judge a program in terms of certain questions: How efficiently, predictably, and precisely are the program's goals being achieved? Have there been increases in student achievement scores and retention rates as a result of the program? What is the cost of goal achievement per unit, i.e., student, teacher, materials? The information he gets in response to these questions can be compared with other programs, much like soap advertisers do with their products on television. For example, three brands of detergent may be compared as to how well they achieve the outcomes on which they are tested. The detergent which makes a garment whiter and fresher may be judged by the television viewer as having greater worth. Similarly, comparative figures on achievement, costs, and time may be used by evaluators to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and success of school programs. Within ends-means interpretation, indication of a program's worth is based primarily on how well means relate to ends.

(c) Implied Social Relations:

Within any evaluation task there is a relationship set up between the evaluator and the evaluatee. Teachers and students must define the evaluator's role in some way, and the evaluator must define his relation to the school personnel. As such, evaluation is always a social activity.

Associated with ends-means interpretation may be a particular set of social relations. Because sophisticated statistical techniques are generally needed to test the relationship between means and ends in a program, the evaluator's role increasingly becomes that of an expert. His expertise is linked with his ability to select and apply the proper technique to a program. On the basis of his technique he can clinically

diagnose problems and prescribe proper remedial treatment. His 'ownership' of the specialized knowledge necessary for using technique gives him social power in evaluation situations. He has the power to define the relevant problems and solutions, and to assess a school situation according to the standard implied by his formula and technique. As the expert makes decisions for teachers and students, his power over them tends to be hierarchical and unidirectional. Since he is the producer of evaluative knowledge, teachers and students as the consumers are placed in a passive and powerless role. Consequently, a 'giver-receiver' social relation is implied within an ends-means interpretation of programs.

When dependent upon ends-means interpretation, an evaluator is not concerned with the meaning and purposes which teachers and students give to programs. Statistics may be compiled, outcomes measured and compared to objectives, and predictive hypotheses formulated without much regard for what the actors within classrooms mean in their acting. Second-order abstractions leave out the flesh and blood associated with concrete and unique school programs. Largely ignored are the viewpoints and interpretations of people living in the event. Consequently, the 'outsider's' rather than the 'insider's' perspective may become the frame of reference as evaluators impose their own values, models of explanation, and research goals upon a program. What it means for teachers and students to live in the situation, how they make it meaningful for themselves, and in what ways it is relevant to their concerns and aims are traded off for what the outsider defines as meaningful and relevant. The insiders' ideas may not be considered adequate or even necessary descriptions of a program.

Some Tasks of Ends-Means Interpretation

Some of the tasks of ends-means interpretation are illustrated by the following questions:

1. To assess the degree of relatedness between means and ends:
 - 1.1 How effective are the means in achieving the ends?
 - 1.2 How much consistency is there between and among the objectives, content, resources, and strategies of the program?
 - 1.3 How much certainty (precision) is there in predicting (achieving) the specified outcomes?
2. To compare this relatedness among programs:
 - 2.1 Which program is the most cost effective and time efficient?
 - 2.2 Which program produces greater net increases on outcome performance indicators?

These few questions highlight the task of evaluation as one which adjusts ends and means.

Considering evaluation tasks primarily as technical sense-making has some advantages. Often, the application of technique may be the

fastest way to develop or evaluate a program. Time may be saved because of the technical expertise of the individuals involved, and the centralized control from the top (i.e., experts) down may allow the entire process to be structured and efficient. Trial and error may be minimized, and the application of means may increase the certainty of product outcomes in accordance with the predefined ends. Depending upon the type and amount of expertise and technique involved, 'quality' products may be procured which are 'academically sound,' consistent with current 'curricular thinking,' and 'packaged' in an appealing and persuading manner.

Evaluation of programs will remain largely an ends-means task which depends to a certain extent upon the application of technique. But a difficulty arises when evaluation is viewed only as a technical task and other perspectives are excluded. Situational and critical perspectives are two frameworks which may be useful also for generating and interpreting data about school programs. These two perspectives should be integrated with the ends-means perspective in program evaluation.

PART B: SITUATIONAL SENSE-MAKING OF PROGRAMS

One of the basic things we observe about man is that he constantly gives meaning to things: he is forced to define the ever-changing situations of which he is a part, to classify the things around him, to shape his perceptions, to interpret his experience, to anticipate the actions of others, and to interrelate the past and present. In other words, meaning is everything to man. Because it underlies all he does, he rarely recognizes the importance and pervasiveness of meaning for the human world. Metaphorically, he seldom questions, let alone recognizes, the oxygen around him. He needs an anti-environment to make him aware of oxygen, as when he climbs a mountain or dives into water and recognizes his own shortage of breath. At these points, he realizes how important oxygen is as a component of his environment. So it is with the context of meaning which cradles his daily activities. Disturb meaning and man suddenly realizes that he does not experience the world randomly, but as a meaningful whole. His daily experiences of it fit together within a meaning situation or context. Only momentarily does the importance of meaning contexts break through to him. For example,

I am walking along a sandy beach. Suddenly I am aware of how long the waves and tides have moved the sand beneath me. For a moment my life seems so hopelessly short. Feelings of my temporality seize me as I realize that I am but a moment in time. My projects become insignificant as my temporality takes me headlong. It cannot be stopped or slowed. Relentlessly it drives. Helpless, I realize that time cannot be conserved or spent. I just wait, but I

cannot wait in a vacuum. I must give meaning to my world. Who am I? I am here, now. To this time and place I must give meaning. As I leave the beach, I once again enter the various situations which are my environment and which cradle my existence in meaning.

Man is the 'namer' of his world because his consciousness is active rather than passive. From the moment a person is born until he dies he is engaged in differentiating his world in various meaningful ways. The common-sense and the theoretical realities in which he lives and acts are possible because he constructs and interprets meaning through language, body movements, symbols, artifacts, and activities. Therefore, to study and understand social situations, the investigator must be concerned with uncovering meaning. Evaluation can be viewed as situational interpretation of school programs.

Some Aims of Situational Interpretation

In classroom situations actors give programs a variety of meanings. The task of the evaluator is to uncover the relevance and meaning which a program has for the various groups involved: students, parents, teachers, administrators, and so on. For example, a description of the backgrounds and attitudes which students bring to a program, as well as the situational factors which influence it at a particular time and place, may be useful data for interpreting and judging a program. The evaluator becomes the interpreter who asks certain questions: What sense are actors making of a program? What are their perceptions and viewpoints? What is its relevance for them? Do they view it as appropriate to their school situation? To collect these data, the evaluator needs more than his ends-means techniques and skills. He needs to interpret the entire meaning context in which he finds a program.

Some Assumptions of Situational Interpretation

As with ends-means interpretation, a number of assumptions are made in situational evaluation about (a) programs, (b) worth, and (c) social relations.

(a) Implied View of Programs:

A premise made about programs is that they are interpreted and defined variously by groups on the basis of conflicting interests and background experiences. Any program may have as many personal meanings and degrees of relevance as there are teachers and students who experience it. There is no one program (as defined by the 'master' curriculum plan) but as many programs as there are groups interpreting and experiencing something they refer to as a 'program' in different situations. The program and the local situation are inseparable.

(b) Implied View of Worth:

The worth of a program is judged on its relevance and meaningfulness

to the various participants. Do students, teachers, and other actors perceive and experience the program as appropriate and of interest to their own situations and concerns?

What are their standards of worth? This criterion of worth is important in any school system which tolerates and represents value pluralism, diverse lifestyles, and multiculturalism. The views of people who are involved in the 'teaching,' 'learning,' and 'supporting' of a program cannot be neglected. If they do not find a program particularly meaningful, their perceptions in part become a basis for judging worthwhileness, and this information becomes useful for subsequent program revision.

(c) Implied Social Relations:

Imbedded within any evaluation stance is an implied social relation between evaluator and program personnel. In an ends-means evaluation, the evaluator tends to be the 'expert' because he is the one in possession of the technique used to measure/improve the relation of means to ends. He has the specialized knowledge of how to apply the technique properly and efficiently. Conversely, the role of program personnel becomes a passive one. They are acted upon through expertise and objectified through technique. On the other hand, situational evaluation implies a different social relation among participants. Each one brings his own expertise and knowledge to the evaluation. Each has to offer his own perceptions and experiences of a program. In this manner, the evaluator becomes a participant who attempts to draw out through dialogue the interpretations, criticisms, and standards of worth brought to a program by the various participating groups.

Some Tasks of Situational Interpretation

Some of the tasks of situational interpretation could be stated as follows:

1. To make explicit the perceptions of various groups:
 - 1.1 What constitutes the 'program' in the view of the participating groups?
 - 1.2 Do they perceive the program as meaningful, relevant, and appropriate to their own situations and concerns?
 - 1.3 What are the perceived strengths and concerns?
2. To make explicit the situational setting of a program:
 - 2.1 What frames of reference do participating groups bring to the program? (e.g., cultural and experiential frames of reference, intentions, background, values).
 - 2.2 What is the place and understanding of the program in the larger school and community context?

These illustrative questions can be pursued in various ways: interviews, open-ended questionnaires, classroom transcripts, participant observations and ethnographies, and case studies. Methods for defining and collecting appropriate information will vary with the situation and the evaluator's purposes. However, focus is upon the multiple viewpoints which the participating actors use to interpret the program experienced in their own unique situations. The purpose of situation descriptions is to uncover meaning.

A broad range of literature is available to the evaluator interested in various conceptions and applications of situational studies (e.g., ethnographies, interviews, participant observations). Various key ideas such as 'meaning,' 'relevance,' 'situation,' 'frame of reference,' 'validity,' 'motive,' 'understanding,' and 'intent,' need to be understood because they represent the conceptual basis for evaluation in this mode. Writers within social phenomenology (e.g., Schutz, Cicourel, Berger) and hermeneutics (e.g., Palmer, Hirsch) may offer helpful points of departure for the evaluator.

Obviously a situational perspective alone is not a sufficient guide for evaluating school programs. As with an ends-means perspective, a situational perspective is limited as a framework because it allows the evaluator to see certain aspects of a program but not other important aspects. To help overcome the limiting effect which any one perspective provides, the evaluators must consciously adopt multiperspectives.

PART C: CRITICAL SENSE-MAKING OF PROGRAMS

All educational practice implies a theoretical stance on the educator's part. This stance in turn implies - sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly - an interpretation of man and the world. It could not be otherwise (Freire, 1970:205, 206).

Our daily activities and thinking are based upon fundamental views, interests, ideologies, and value stances. Critical interpretation accounts for school programs in terms of these more basic, and possibly hidden perspectives which undergird thinking and acting. The evaluator needs to ask questions which probe, uncover, and make explicit the foundations of a program.

Most evaluations generate data which can be referred to as first-order (immediate interpretations of experience) or second-order (theoretical interpretations of experience) descriptions of school programs. Critical evaluation is neither common-sense description of programs as situational interpretation often tends to be, nor second-order descriptions provided by ends-means interpretation. Second-order typifications are once removed from the program because the experiences of teachers and students are mediated and systematized in terms of highly formalized models or hypotheses. First-order typifications are common-sense or surface level descriptions which an actor gives concerning the meaning and reason for situations in

terms of his immediate plans and projects. These descriptions provide sufficient accounts for an actor's practical purposes at hand in daily school routines. However, his activities and accounts are based upon beliefs (assumptions, images, root metaphors) and intentions (aims, motives, and other interests) which may remain hidden, and which are often legitimized and maintained for him in various ideologies, roles, and institutions. If the rationales provided within programs, the accounts given by teachers or students, or the reasons presented by program developers could be presuppositionless and interest free, then there would be no need to quarrel with the adequacy of first-order descriptions. A critical evaluator does not accept these accounts as sufficient data for making sense of programs, but probes to the underlying foundations which may be implicit and hidden. He gets at the bases of both the first and second-order descriptions. Questions are raised about that which is taken for granted in both ends-means and situational interpretation.

Critical sense-making occurs when the evaluator 'makes problematic' that which is taken for granted in programs. To 'make problematic' is to make explicit and to question that which underlies our school experiences. The underlying data include the beliefs and thought-forms upon which our thinking and acting rest: presupposed standards, logics, images of man and the future, assumptions about knowledge, criteria of what is worth pursuing, root metaphors, and perspectives.

Some Aims of Critical Interpretation

The aims of critical inquiry vary depending upon the particular task and stance of the evaluator. Its intents are broad. However, there are general aims which characterize critical interpretation in evaluation.

A primary intent of critical interpretation is that educators be self-reflective and aware of the fundamental beliefs which inform everyday decision making in classrooms. Critical reflection forces them to examine their previously unquestioned views of programs, students, and school. This type of sense-making may be quite different from that used by teachers, administrators, or program developers when engaged in their routine tasks. They may be much like the man-on-the-street described by Alfred Schutz in his studies of the everyday world. Most problems at hand are dealt with in practical ways without questioning the choice of means or ends beyond that which has immediate application. There appears to be no need for examining assumptions. Critical reflection, on the other hand, 'brackets' this practical stance of the man-on-the-street in order to stand back and examine on-going activities. Its aim is to uncover and clarify, to go beyond that which is evident immediately, to make aware.

It is not enough, though, just to describe the underlying beliefs and interests upon which a program may rest without also reflecting upon the implications of these beliefs and interests. What social relations in the classroom do these beliefs maintain and legitimize? Do these beliefs serve the interests of any one particular group? How are these beliefs related to larger ideologies within society? The purpose of this questioning is not only to make us aware of how school programs are constructed

upon a foundation of beliefs, but also to have us reflect upon the implications of these presuppositions. We may then make explicit the social structures and relationships legitimized and maintained through them.

Further, once educators are aware of the taken for grantedness and implications of their beliefs, then the use of critical reflection may help them validate their positions. In validating an underlying belief, a question of the form "What reasons do you have for holding that view-point?" is generally asked. Though such a question is difficult to answer, it is possible once the attitudes underlying a program are identified and clarified. Habermas states that:

Representations and descriptions are never independent of standards. And the choice of these standards is based on attitudes that require critical consideration by means of arguments, because they cannot be either logically deduced or empirically demonstrated (1971:312).

In the dialogue that constitutes critical sense-making, participants become increasingly aware of reasons for their beliefs and interests. The outcome is greater self-understanding and increased clarification of a program's perspectives.

Critical examination of programs and classroom activities provides a basis for reorientation and change. Increased awareness may help us liberate ourselves from the perspectives in which we may have become trapped. It is easy to do things without considering alternatives, or without recognizing that there may be other ways of thinking and acting in school situations. As such, critical inquiry and change are inseparable. In the very process of thinking critically the individual is changing his social reality. The taken for granted is transformed by being made explicit. Reflection upon our 'seeing' changes the very seeing itself. Critical sense-making without transformation ends in cynicism.

Some Assumptions of Critical Interpretation

A number of assumptions underlie critical evaluation of programs:

(a) Implied View of Programs:

From a critical stance, an evaluator views a program as being something different than either an ends-means relationship or the perceptions various groups have of a situation. For him a program is a set of assumptions, beliefs, and values. Classroom activities take place against a silent background of various premises and interests. A perspective is implicit in every choice educators make, and their actions are guided by an outlook. They have a frame of reference for 'seeing' students, interpreting reality, defining situations, and making sense of things. Within a program are premises about knowledge, students, teaching, learning,

worthwhileness, equality, and so on.

Program perspectives are shaped within larger political, geographical, and social contexts of educators. Their outlooks are not only associated with, but also serve, the interests of various groups (e.g., class, occupational, political, religious). Because educators are members of these groups, there is little neutrality in teaching, developing, or evaluating programs. Bias is inevitable because group members specify goals, select materials, and define activities. These tasks cannot be accomplished with a blank mind, without prior presuppositions and beliefs, with an interest free stance, or with empty anticipations. Inevitably, these perspectives are shaped by former experiences within social and geographical locations, and political affiliations. Because everyone brings a viewpoint to the tasks at hand, and because this perspective serves as a basis for thinking and acting, the evaluator needs to examine the foundations of a program.

In terms of the classroom, critical interpretation is necessary because through a program people guide student thinking and interpret experience for them. Students may be manipulated in terms of a particular group's interests, and be taught to accept uncritically certain values and beliefs. Since the developers may have the power to control the thinking of students, an evaluator needs to ask the question, "In whose interest is this power and control exercised?"

Therefore, viewpoints should be made explicit since we can change our beliefs as we recognize the consequences they may have for our activities. If we fail to question them, then we may treat social realities, shaped and maintained in our beliefs, as having an autonomous existence apart from us. We tend to reify them. Consequently, fundamental changes in programs represent changes of underlying belief, value stances, and perspective.

(b) Implied Social Relations:

A root metaphor which may help us to understand the role of a critical evaluator is that of a 'psycho-analyst.' His role is to help a person define his situation and reflect upon his motives, thereby increasing his self-knowledge. The therapist does not take what the patient says at face value. Rather, he probes beneath what is said. Through questioning he may uncover the patient's background reasons, repressed motives and fears, and perspectives. The analyst serves as a mirror helping patients to self-reflect. The unmasking, uncovering, and making explicit provides them a basis for change. This psycho-analytic metaphor may be useful as a mode of evaluation when applied to understanding institutions, roles, groups, classroom situations, or even to one's own daily activities. It helps us to ask questions which go beneath the surface, the immediate, and the taken for granted, to that which may be initially hidden. A program evaluator can be seen, therefore, as a 'therapist' who questions the basis of a school program.

Since critical reflection is a two-way street, it cannot be the task

of an external 'expert' alone. Like a therapist, the evaluator is involved with people in mutual self-reflection. When engaged in questioning a school program, he is also questioning himself. Initial critical reflection leads to further questions, which in turn leads to a greater reflection. The process of reflection is dialectical, and the outcome of this dialectic is a mutual growth of self-understanding on the part of all who are involved. Therefore, the method and context is one of open dialogue and mutual questioning. All participants can question and be questioned. There are no positions of privilege, nor can critical sense-making be imposed upon someone. It must be open and free dialogue.

Some Tasks of Critical Interpretation

In this paper we have characterized critical evaluation as a making explicit of foundations, an unveiling of the hidden, or a questioning of the taken for granted. The whole endeavour of criticism represents an attempt to get at the 'roots' of programs. These roots are beliefs, assumptions, metaphors, and intents underlying a program. Further, they are maintained on the basis of legitimizations which may be based on ideologies. Therefore, some of the tasks of critical sense-making in program evaluation could be stated as follows:

1. To make explicit perspectives (of man, knowledge, or whatever) underlying programs:
 - 1.1 What are the underlying intents?
 - 1.2 What are the underlying assumptions?
 - 1.3 What are the underlying approaches?
2. To make explicit social relations maintained and legitimized through perspectives:
 - 2.1 What teaching relations are implied?
 - 2.2 What views of students are implied?
 - 2.3 Whose interests are being served?
3. To make explicit sources of these perspectives:
 - 3.1 Are the root metaphors appropriate?
 - 3.2 What are the implications of 'borrowing' these metaphors from other fields?
4. To make explicit the control function of these perspectives:
 - 4.1 What 'knowledge' is selected and neglected?
 - 4.2 In what ways do these perspectives allow/disallow us to see?
 - 4.3 Who has the power to control?
5. To make explicit arguments/criteria/standards for changing these perspectives:
 - 5.1 What alternative perspectives can be considered?
 - 5.2 Are these perspectives 'ethically' justifiable?
 - 5.3 Are these perspectives consistent with our basic

values and views of man?

These questions need to be modified and expanded when applied to particular programs. They direct us to the foundations upon which school realities are constructed and maintained by participants.

Most important, a critical perspective is like a knife which cuts both ways. We must be reflective of the very perspectives we use for critical sense-making. Any clarifying of perspective of others or within programs is itself perspective guided. In arguing for point-of-viewism, one cannot presume himself free of a viewpoint. One way to deal with this dilemma is to make explicit and reflect upon the theoretical, and methodological beliefs within which our own thinking is situated. Critical evaluation does not allow the evaluator or his evaluation method to be taken for granted. His underlying bases must also be questioned and probed, or else he becomes encapsulated within his own critical perspective. To some extent, therefore, the evaluator must turn his methods on himself. Evaluation of evaluation is continuous.

Critical interpretation of programs must be rooted in some framework which informs the evaluator of the meaning of "criticism" itself. What he considers to be the foundations of a program is dependent upon the explicit or implicit framework that serves as his interpretive lenses when selecting, examining, and judging any phenomenon. The initial framework provides the concepts from which questions can be generated for inquiring into the foundations of educational realities.

Critical sense-making is not something new, but has a long and varied tradition in the literature. Attempts to trace and describe this thinking disclose its various forms. Much of the current critical literature is grounded in neo-Marxist views of man and society. This framework has been used by many evaluators to make penetrating observations about the foundations of programs, especially in terms of their relation to structural inequalities within the larger social context. However, acceptance of the presuppositions of neo-Marxist frameworks is not prerequisite for engaging in critical sense-making. Other frameworks are also applicable for helping educators in critical reflection. Social phenomenology, sociology of knowledge, and literary criticism provide theoretical and methodological sources for guiding the evaluator. Naturally, many of these frameworks overlap and can be combined. It is evident that more than one framework is available for critical sense-making and consequently, selection of a framework must be made on the basis of its appropriateness to the phenomenon under study and the evaluator's intent.

CONCLUSION

What constitutes an evaluation 'problem?'
What makes an activity 'evaluation?'

An array of responses are generated whenever evaluators are asked to consider these questions. Their responses not only show what evaluators

consider to be important when examining programs, but also their conception of the tasks of evaluation. A useful exercise, therefore, is to have evaluators list the concerns which they consider to be appropriate guides for evaluation research. Once listed, these concerns can be grouped into clusters. Reflection upon the clusters may help all participants to identify some of the major perspectives which guide program evaluation. In this paper I have described three fundamental perspectives for interpreting and making sense of school programs.

First, an evaluator may focus his attention on the relationship between means and ends in a program. He may analyze and judge the methods used in a program on how well they help educators achieve specified goals. Second, an evaluator may focus his attention on the perceptions which people have of a program, whether these people be students, teachers, parents, or administrators. He judges a program on the situational meaning and relevance which it may have in the experience of various classroom participants. Third, an evaluator may focus his attention on the foundations of a program, including its underlying values and assumptions, and the worth of its goals.

Evaluation as ends-means interpretation, situational interpretation, and critical interpretation are three ways of making sense of programs. They differ from one another in terms of their purposes, appropriate datum, and methodological approaches. Each perspective implies a view of programs, a criterion for judging the worth of programs, a particular social relationship between evaluator and program personnel (e.g., students, teachers), and an outcome for improving programs. Since each of these perspectives allows an evaluator to generate data and make sense of programs in slightly different ways, they are not to be viewed as being in competition. All three of these perspectives represent an interpreting and making sense of the world in ways appropriate for different purposes. An evaluator who has multiple perspectives at his disposal can gain a larger picture of any school program. Therefore, ends-means, situational, and critical perspectives need to be adopted by evaluators and used for disclosing differing aspects of school programs.

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Chapter III

EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS A DIMENSION OF EVALUATION*

Peter Rothe

My purpose in this chapter is to outline a method of evaluation which is attentive to meanings teachers and students give to a classroom. The method represents a mode of evaluation sensitive to Jackson's (1968, vii) suggestion that:

Classroom life...is too complex an affair to be viewed or talked about from any single perspective. Accordingly, as we try to grasp the meaning of what school is like for students and teachers we must not hesitate to use all the ways of knowing at our disposal.
(Emphasis added.)

Educators generally assume that evaluation is a prerequisite to objective decision-making (Bussis *et al* 1975). Bussis, however, asserts that decision-making is basically a human activity which involves value judgments (or weights) placed on whatever evidence is available to decision-makers. The meaning of the evidence depends on the extent to which decision-makers agree that the available evidence has been gathered impartially and represents "important" information. Individuals make decisions from different facets of common-sense knowledge; the information itself does not decide. Therefore, "information gatherers" should broaden their perspectives on what constitutes quality data for decisions. Evaluation researchers need to include information gathering processes which are designed to produce descriptive data about human qualities and school contexts.

When debating the viability of an expanded data gathering approach, one should be cognizant of Aristotle's enjoinder that in any inquiry the "precision" to be expected must be in proportion to the nature of the subject in question. For example, mathematical meaning is precise, whereas in people's daily lives meanings in situations change with circumstances. In the social setting of a classroom, the meanings individuals give to the class change as circumstances in the classroom change. Such meanings affect a person's understanding of the everyday world of a school classroom and influence the teaching, learning, knowing and doing that occurs. This point may be illustrated by Scheler's (1972) discussion on human labour. The phenomenon of human labour is not a response to environmental conditions but is based on value orientation. What labour means to the labourer determines his attitude towards it. Similarly, what social studies classroom experiences mean to students and teachers determine their attitudes towards the program, which in turn affect the "what", "how" and "why" of learning and instruction. Consequently, a descriptive account of the meanings which students and

*Paper presented at a CUFA Symposium, the Annual Conference of the National Council for the Social Studies, Cincinnati, Ohio, November 25, 1977.

teachers give to aspects of the classroom is desirable in order to acquire a more thorough understanding of the "horizon" in which education occurs.

PART A: COMPLEMENTARY ACCOUNTS

Historically the focus in evaluation has tended to be a quest for efficiency, stability, human predictability, and social control (Apple, 1974). Numerous evaluators limit themselves to a technical orientation comprised of psychometrics (Cronbach, 1970), systems operations (Stufflebeam, 1972; Alkin, 1969; Provus, 1972), and means-ends congruency (Stake, 1968). They commit themselves to an exaggerated regard for the significance of quantitative data. A fundamental belief that "when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind," underlies numerous social studies evaluation projects (Kaplan, 1964:172). Curriculum evaluation projects have typically treated a person as a particular type of object. Evaluators have identified students in terms of age group, social class, intelligence quotient, knowledge achievement, comprehension rating, technical competence, efficiency, etc., but have said little about their peculiarities, uniqueness, and experiences. Conventionally, evaluators have used statistical correlations for purposes of generalization, judgment, and control without "adequately" understanding the contextual situation of students or teachers. For example, standardized achievement tests are successful in telling what "specific" knowledge a student has learned, but they indicate little about whether a student "can do" or "does" anything with the formal knowledge in his "real life world." Contrived laboratory tasks indicate what is possible for a student to do, but they give little information on what a pupil does freely in his life tasks and relationships. Teachers, on the other hand, are requested to volunteer data pertaining to specific categories such as instructional methodologies, resource appropriateness, definition of curriculum objectives, classroom learning efficiency, clarity and conciseness of curriculum guides, etc., but they are seldom asked to describe personal interactions they experience with students, colleagues, and community.

Wallraff (1970) implies that procedures designed to measure social activities are opaque, constituting a "limit to understanding." Similarly, Greene (1973) credits statistical evaluation procedures with aiding depersonalization, since they entail a one-dimensional view of man. Conventional evaluation categories fail to describe the individual acting with meaning in a situation. Although teacher and student relationships focus on formal subject matter, each teacher realizes a personal meaning in curriculum, and each student searches for personal participation in programs and classroom activities (Bowers, 1974). At the classroom level there are as many curricula as there are teachers and students who interpret and experience them. Although bound by curriculum guidelines, teachers and students give meanings to classroom activities. Their meanings differ in accordance with the uniqueness of each person. An individual always decides what his existence will be at any given moment. It occurs when individuals experience shifting moods, feelings, impulses and fantasies while struggling to cope

with the world of social studies (Frankl, 1964). Thus an understanding of meanings intended by those who act, think, and plan in the "here and now" world of social studies is necessary. When one uncovers and understands meanings an individual gives to various facets of social studies, one removes the opaqueness of research. Individual intentions, potentialities and meanings, usually taken for granted by evaluators, need to be highlighted in order to present a more thorough contextual description of a situation. As co-existing human beings, evaluators should be more attentive to the personal inward human dimension and see how it might complement the view of the person in conventional evaluation.

The concept of complementary relationships had its origin in Bohr's (1964) explorations of wave-corpuscle dualism. He suggested that complementary modes of interpretation may describe the dualism more adequately. Although two modes of interpretation may be mutually exclusive, they may be juxtaposed in order to bring out the perceptual content of a phenomenon (Heisenberg, 1971). Bohr (cited in Heisenberg, 1971:93) posits that:

Alternation (complementarity) is...like the two faces of an object that never can be seen at the same time but which must be visualized in turn, however, in order to describe the object completely... . The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. The opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth.

De Broglie (cited in Matson, 1964) supports the conceptual importance of complementarity in the social sciences. Since evaluation is subsumed in the human sciences, an evaluation approach complementing the conventional ends-means approach is appropriate. It presents the evaluator with an opportunity to become attentive to situational meanings that had previously been overlooked. The scientist-philosopher Polanyi (1969:114) shares a similar view as illustrated in his analogy:

Whenever we are focussing our attention on a particular object, we are relying for doing so on our awareness of many things to which we are not attending directly at the moment, but which are yet functioning as compelling clues for the way the object of our attention will appear to our senses. An obvious and often commented instance of this is our tendency to overlook things that are unprecedented.

In psychological research, investigators like Giorgi (1972) and Van Kaam (1969) agree that complementary information based on philosophical presuppositions different from conventional behavioral research is required for a more complete description of human phenomenon. The information should be in the form of descriptions about subjects experiencing their situations. In order to acquire a greater understanding of the method, an overview of the assumptions underlying existential phenomenology and their relations to education is required.

PART B: THE PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDING

Every systematic inquiry into human phenomena has a philosophical grounding (Strasser, 1973; Greene, 1973). An implicit view regarding the nature of man provides the orientation towards an evaluation of methodology (van Eckatsberg, 1971; Sjöberg, 1959). Questions regarding the nature of emotion, language, education, society and similar human manifestations represent metaphysical philosophy. Kafka (cited in Strasser, 1973:210) posits that an individual does not have a choice between psychology with metaphysical content and psychology free from metaphysics, but every psychology contains metaphysical presuppositions. The metaphysical question, "What is it to be a person?" underlies the existential-phenomenological evaluation approach. Existential-phenomenologists attempt to answer the ontological question by searching for universal conceptual features that characterize being. Whereas Husserl saw the task of transcendental phenomenology as describing the "lived world" from the viewpoint of a detached observer, existential phenomenologists insist that the observer cannot separate himself from the world (Strasser, 1967). Proponents of this philosophy follow rigorously the implications of the intentionality of consciousness. Consciousness is always intended as being consciousness of... . The world and consciousness are correlates of one another, and modalities of conscious experience are the way one is in the world (Stewart and Mickunas, 1974).

A person is both a being-in-the-world and a being-conscious-of-the-world (Heidegger, 1962). This view emphasizes a dual character of man as "being shaped and giving shape." Man is not only made by the world in which he comes into being, but as he develops his abilities and powers he gives shape to the world, to himself, and to others. In daily life man gives meaning through his purposes in the world. He is a dynamic being who is conscious of his situations in the world. By being immersed in different situations man continuously searches for identity and fulfilment through freedom and responsible choice (Ricoeur, 1975). In his search for personhood other people are indispensable. Consequently, his being-in-the-world is a co-existing being whereby man decides what he is and what others are (Jaspers, 1965). The existential-phenomenological thesis that man is an inter-subjective, existential being will be applied to education. To guide the achievement of an "interface" between existential-phenomenology and education, a number of strategic concepts require clarification.

Freedom and Situation

Although every individual is independent and unique, his freedom is circumscribed by the conditions imposed upon him by the situation in which he finds himself. A typical "situation" is characterized by a person's position in the world: all the obstacles he meets, the help he receives, and the resistance he has to overcome in order to reach his aims (Stern, 1967). Strasser (1963) suggests that situations arise out of environments when human intentions (projects) are present. Within any specific segment of space and time, an individual finds himself confronted with persons, things, conditions, and relations which are indispensable for the actual pursuit of his potentiality. Yet, each situation consists of factors which restrict or enhance in a dialectic fashion man's freedom "from" and man's freedom "to". This dialectic

between man's intentions and his relation to freedom in a situation is clarified in the following illustration:

In 1804 Saint Bruno went to establish himself as a hermit in a savage region of the French Alps. By the very fact that Saint Bruno seeks a place where he and his companions can devote themselves undisturbed to their meditations, the environment (physical geography) ceases to be an environment. The saint asks the mountains and valleys a question: "Where can I establish myself as a hermit?" The mountains and valleys reply, albeit wordlessly. They reply by what they are. Thus there begins a dialectic, in which things are involved negatively and positively. They are opposed to, or in favour of a certain human intention. They are "useful", "safe", "harmful", "unsuitable", "dangerous". Precisely because things arrange themselves, as it were, around an intention, a "situation" is born (Strasser, 1963:274).

A situation exists in correlation with one's project (referred to by Strasser as intention): one's attempt to transcend the actual facts in his journey toward a goal (Sartre, 1956). The reality of a situation is revealed to an individual in terms of how it resists or aids his project. Sartre cites the following analogy to clarify his thought:

A big mountain, for instance, offers tremendous resistance if my free project is to build a railroad, for then I have to dig a tunnel through it. On the other hand, it is a big help if my free project is to see the surrounding landscape. Only in the light of my free project is this mountain either an obstacle or a help; in itself, it is neutral (Stern, 1967:145).

In daily reality individuals are restricted as to the possibilities available for choosing. For example, classroom freedom is not an 'acosmic freedom'. Restrictions are always present. Individuals continuously encounter restrictions as objective and undeniable situational facts. Government agencies, social interest groups, education traditions and anonymous expectations of society reduce freedom of choice in pedagogical and learning situations. However, depending on one's perspective of project, restrictions may become catalysts of freedom. For example, the curriculum guide is a government document which formally restricts teachers as to the topics or content they may teach, time they may allot for course coverage, and resources they may use. Yet despite these restrictions, teachers and students develop programs and activities related to the guidelines. In terms of instructional possibilities, teachers make critical pedagogical and knowledge choices which affect their relationships to the students, student futures, and their standing in the teaching profession. Students may respond to the curriculum content with confidence if they are aware of its relevance to their future. If their feelings, intuitions and thoughts do not correspond to 'what is expected' feelings of unease or passivity may occur. It is their choice.

Choice

Life presents people with choices. In daily activities individuals continuously choose, often without knowing which alternative course is best. As Ortega states:

There is in man...the inescapable impression that his life, and with it his being, is something which has to be chosen. The fact is amazing; because it means that, unlike all other entities in the universe, which have a being that is given to them ready made and by virtue of which they exist, i.e., because of which they already are what they are, man is almost inconceivably a reality which exists without having a being irremediably being prefixed who congruently, is not yet what he is but must choose for himself his own being. How will he choose it? Because he will imagine in his own mind many types of possible lives...he will, doubtless, notice that some of them attract him more (Stern, 1967:49).

But what is meant by choice? Husserl (1966) conceptualizes choice as an individual's encounter with open and problematic possibilities. Open possibilities seem irrelevant since they have no specific weight and are all equally possible. Individuals select from things they take for granted in biographically and socially determined situations. Simple illustrations are a person choosing to eat with a fork, drink from a glass, or wash with soap. On the other hand, Husserl notes that at any time a person may find himself placed among problematic alternatives. Hence he relies upon his preferences to determine the course of his future conduct (Schutz, 1970). The problematic possibilities the individual encounters originate in doubt since they may be in contest with one another. To choose, therefore, means to be aware--or to have the disposition of becoming aware--that alternatives are open and that one of these will be chosen (Koestenbaum, 1977).

Based on Jasper's "Ich wähle" (I choose) rather than Descartes' "Cogito", each individual is a chooser. A man always becomes something; in choosing with passion he chooses to become himself (Terryakin, 1962). Choosing enables the individual to come to an understanding of what he really is, or is-to-be. What matters, therefore, is not only "what" a person decides, but also "how" he decides.

Practical Reasoning

An individual chooses his projects on the basis of practical reasoning. In the last analysis, decisions (or completed acts of "having made choices") need to be justified. Reasoning is a way of justification (Jehensen, 1973). The reasons need not be logical (or reconstructed as in the analytic-empirical mode), but rather practical, personal, and situationally relevant to the individual. For example, in a classroom there are numerous possibilities; whenever a teacher or student makes a choice he engages in practical reasoning about why he chose one possibility over another.

Practical reasoning may be conceptualized as choice and action directed towards (intended towards) the act. Intentional action and choice can be explained in terms of motives, in the sense of "reason for acting" (Ricoeur, 1975; Schutz, 1973). When a person gives a reason this means: He asks you to consider the action in a certain light, to place it in a certain perspective, to consider it as... To state a motive (in the sense of reasoning) is to give a meaning which can be communicated verbally to another person and understood by him; the motive (reason) makes the choosing such and such (Ricoeur, 1975; Jehensen, 1973). To allege a motive (reason) is to clarify in the eyes of others and in one's own eyes what one does.

Greene (1967) affirms the importance practical reasoning has for uncovering meanings in the classroom. Reasoning clarifies and binds together the elements which emerge in the teacher's and students' experience. In other words, practical reasoning is the "locus" of meaning, and constitutes the meanings an individual gives to his immediate situation (Jehensen, 1973); thus meanings in a classroom can be investigated through practical reasoning underlying educational choices.

Responsibility

The individual takes responsibility for his choices. In existential phenomenology, responsibility is regarded as given. To feel responsible for one's action is not merely a desirable frame of mind, but is the recognition of a fact of human existence, a fact that follows directly from an individual's understanding of freedom (Koestenbaum, 1977). According to Frankl (1959) responsibility is the very essence of human existence which bears the stamp of authenticity. If questioned, the individual needs to answer for himself and accept full responsibility for his choice. Stern's interpretation of Sartre characterizes the situation succinctly:

When I choose, I incur an awesome responsibility not only toward myself, but toward other people as well, for when I make a choice I make a decision for all those in the orbit of my own behavior and experience (1969:67).

Since choosing a project is always an adventure into the future, a person must accept the responsibility of potentially restricting future freedoms. For example, as a high school student an individual may choose the project of becoming a medical doctor. He accepts the responsibility of enrolling in "prescribed courses", doing "x" hours of schoolwork, and spending "y" years at a medical college. Thus the student is deciding to become something he presently is not.

Being and Becoming

Being is a person's fundamental involvement within definite situations encountered in his life. Being is comprised of choosing and reasoning within any "here and now".

An individual's being consists in his becoming. Man is not so much what he is as he is what he is not. Man continuously strives to transcending heights. He is a horizon of possibilities which manifest themselves historically in concrete situations. Man is what he has become; he is what he will become; but even more, he is the transcending source of still further becoming. Man is a subject who is not merely concerned about being free 'to be', but being free to realize open possibilities which constitute his becoming. Thus, becoming is a higher reality than being, since no present reality is the "be all and end all". Man is forever immersed in "having to be" (Heidegger, 1962). Becoming is a process of transition from a possibility in the mind to an actuality in the wholeness of a person. For example, a teacher may take his class on a field trip to a ghost town. A student, if left to his own exploration, may stop before a grave marked only by a cross made of two branches. At that moment he may feel speechless. As he stands by an "unmarked grave" he may see his present life as being a holistic part of a past built by unknown men who had future dreams. He silently reflects upon the present and the future when he himself may become a being in an unmarked grave. Thus he may reflect upon the meaning of his present existence.

PART C: MEANING AND EDUCATION

It is necessary to unveil the presence of the speaking subject whereby he attempts to bring the implicit meaning structures of experience to explicit expression (Ponty, 1964). Language is merely a means through which man can convey meaning; but is seldom a source of meaning (Kockelmans, 1972; Heidegger, 1962). Men are examples of sources of meaning (Kockelmans, 1972; Ponty, 1964). Consequently, abstract reified symbols as "poverty" are seen by existential phenomenologists as people experiencing everyday situations. To explicate meanings of "poverty" the existential phenomenologists would ask individuals to describe their world of poverty, rather than extract information from a typified social construct whose meaning is represented in linguistic analysis, statistics, or graphs.

Man, through self-awareness, reaches out to establish meaning through his encounter with the world. He sees the world as parts which unveil themselves one at a time. For example, in a park a man may first see a lake, then see trees, shrubbery and animals. Thus he gives meaning to each segment of the world by organizing the world as a world-for-man.

Since man cannot be separated from the world, he gives meaning to himself while giving meaning to the world. Dialectically man's existence becomes meaningful through his relation with the world, while the existence of the world becomes meaningful through its relation to man (Micaleff, 1969). Through this relationship man and the world establish a dialogue. When man asks the question, the world gives the answer; but neither the question nor the answer make sense separately (Strasser, 1963).

Meaning is also apparent in the dialectic between man and man. The world which the individual encounters is shared with other men. So in

encountering the world-for-man, people encounter not only a world of things, but also a world of men, for they encounter each-other-encountering-the-world (Heidegger, 1962; Jaspers, 1965; Micaleff, 1969).

Each encounter is in a situation. As a result man establishes meaning within each human situation in which he is involved. The situation of concern here is the social studies classroom, conceptualized into exterior and interior components.

Exterior Dimension of a Classroom

When evaluating a social studies program, the evaluator needs to be aware that the classroom represents a situation within wider contexts of school and community. Both school and neighborhood are mutually influenced. Within the neighborhood students and teachers are exposed to different people and events of community life. Geographical location, economic level, industry, transportation, and racial or cultural patterns may influence the meanings students and teachers ascribe to school and classroom (Chamberlin, 1969). For example, a teacher may order certain resource materials, but because of a poor transportation network (mountainous terrain) and a lack of financial priority given by a distant superintendent, delivery of the materials may be delayed six months. Whereas the teacher originally felt committed and responsible to present students with opportunities for a relevant and meaningful social studies experience, he may shift his meanings after hearing of the delay. His reasons for teaching may now be based on the completion of the school year. His only reason for teaching becomes the fulfillment of legal obligations. Undoubtedly, the teacher's feeling of passivity toward school will filter through to the students. Consequently the social studies program will be experienced differently by the teacher and his students.

Interior Dimension of a Classroom

The interior component of a classroom is a setting in which students and teachers plan and organize a segment of the world. As such, this part of the world becomes inseparably connected with student and teacher intentions and potentiality. It becomes the program-in-use which consists of interactions students and teachers have with ideas, objects and events. The classroom, comprised of happenings, occurrences, events and encounters within a stream of time flowing in continuous plasticity, is a micro-world of potential meanings (Rasmussen, 1974). Each person in the classroom responds to things, events, ideas, other persons, and groups in numerous ways and assigns a variety of meanings. The reservoir of meaning has a formative influence on what students and teachers appropriate from their educational experiences (Chamberlin, 1969). For example, if a student is placed in a submission/dominance relationship with the teacher, his meaning of the course may be formed by that one relationship. In other words, everything that occurs in class may be interpreted by the student according to the passive meanings he gives to the teacher's instructional or organizational style. The meaning he assigns to different aspects of the classroom has sustaining significance for future actions. To an evaluator, this

meaning is significant if he is developing an understanding of what the student learns, how he learns, and why he learns.

Similarly, teachers often give meanings to social studies which are influenced by psychological theories, and formal instructional methodologies acquired through their academic biographies. Since each student has his particular history and carries his own interpretations of that history into class, his purposes for attending and his views of his own potentiality may differ from the intents of the teacher. These factors influence the meanings individuals assign to classroom experiences, potentially changing the "how", "what" and "why" of teaching and learning. In order to acquire an understanding of the program-in-use at the classroom level, the evaluator needs to gather information pertaining to situational meanings individuals give to a classroom setting within the context of a community.

There is a need to place this line of thinking within the practical research domain. As in the case of the existential-phenomenologist trying to understand poverty (see page 32), if the evaluator desires to become cognizant of meanings, he must engage individuals in open forms of conversation. In the following section the research vehicle for gathering situational information required for an existential phenomenological analysis is discussed.

PART D: INFORMATION GATHERING

A program evaluator's prime source of data is the teachers and students who act in accordance with their own experiences, relationships, or interactions with persons and objects in a contextual situation. Rasmussen (1972), and Alfred Schutz (1970) propose that the meaning of these everyday social activities can be studied by looking closely at the enterprise of conversation. Interviews, viewed as conversational talk, should be held within the contextual situations of students and teachers to encourage them to speak about social studies experiences which have significance for them.

The interview is based on an assumption that teachers and students think, feel, will and give meaning to their world, rather than being information receptacles which acquire and disseminate information as dictated. Consequently, the intent of interviewing is not to be a one-way, evaluator-centred discussion, but rather a dialogue where each person learns how the other makes sense of his world.

This process was employed satisfactorily in a British Columbia-wide evaluation of social studies. We interviewed numerous teachers and students in their social situation. At all times we made efforts to enter into the right social relationship with students and teachers in order to find out what they think and how they feel. A description of the interview procedure used in the Provincial Assessment of Social Studies in British Columbia 1977-78 is outlined below:

Interview Questions

In order to begin dialogue, a number of open-ended and choice-oriented questions are presented to the participants. The questions have evolved and been revised from and within discussions held with numerous students and teachers. The questions are continuously open for revision, depending on the situation. The intent of the questions is to seek reasons underlying choices. They are directed primarily to subject matter (curriculum knowledge), pedagogical matter (classroom teaching approaches), community (including peers), evaluation, and teacher character traits. Similarly, the teacher-oriented questions pertain to curriculum, resources, pedagogy, community, classroom interaction, and evaluation. Some examples of questions used in the British Columbia-wide social studies evaluation are:

"Examples" of student questions -

1. (a) What social studies topics have you studied this year?
Which of these would you select for further study? Why?
- (b) Which of these one(s) would you decline for further study? Why?
2. What student activities would you choose to include in your social studies? Why did you choose these?
3. If you had a choice in selecting a social studies teacher, what kind of person would you choose? What qualities are important? Why?

"Examples" of teacher questions:

1. Describe what topic(s) you are presently teaching in social studies. What are your reasons for this decision?
2. What teaching approaches have you decided to use? Why did you choose these rather than others?
3. What materials and/or resources are you using to cover this topic? Why?
4. Why did you choose social studies as a teaching area?

Interview Framework

The interviewer leads a small group of five students through various questions, thereby initiating student-student and student-evaluator conversation. It was found that interviews consisting of about five students are a workable conversational pattern, produce information in a relaxed atmosphere, and retain a comfortable group meaning for students. It was found that these strengths overshadowed threats of a group consensus. Such a situation presents the interviewer with an opportunity to define his

position, discuss the intent of the interview, clarify meanings of particular questions, ask further situationally relevant questions, and validate what he hears with the speaker. The open interview also allows students the freedom to expand and clarify their responses, question the interviewer, and question each other within a small group social setting.


Following the student conversations each teacher of the respective student groups should be interviewed. Similar choice-oriented questions should be employed as pivotal points. Teachers should be informed "in good faith" of the interviewer's intents and purposes, discussion procedure used with the students, interpretive framework employed (or he wishes to employ) with student responses, ways the information will be used in the future, as well as some examples of student perceptions. To achieve an authentic dialogic situation the interviewer (evaluator) needs to interact with teachers and students within the parameters of "good faith". For this purpose a framework was developed. The "evaluatee as Co-Evaluator" interview framework employed in the Provincial Assessment of Social Studies in British Columbia consists of the following parts:

1. We shared general impressions about the reasons for interviewing the people involved, etc. Also, we asked for permission to tape the interview. Fortunately the request was always granted in a congenial fashion.
2. We asked participants open-ended choice-oriented questions. These were supplemented with additional questions arising out of the situation.
3. We illustrated how the responses were to be analyzed. We explained the interpretive framework and applied it to a number of sample responses. The participants' reflections and impressions were then discussed.
4. We wrote our first draft reports in everyday language so as to be consistent with the participants' wishes. These reports were and should be written as soon as possible so that the individuals can easily recall their responses and the intents of those responses.
5. The drafts were mailed to the participants for critiquing and reflection. This step was included to capture the participants' world as well as words allow, and to avoid overstatements, unintended implications and loose descriptions. When the evaluatee has validated the evaluator's interpretation an "interface" has been reached. In the Provincial Assessment of Social Studies we found that the participants were generally in agreement with the drafts.
6. Step six refers back to Step one. We informed the participants of the receivership of the information and the amount of information that would be disclosed. Any additional disclosure would require the consent of the participants.

7. Finally we asked the participants to write their impressions of the evaluation activity. To remain consistent with existential-phenomenology we wished to find out what meaning this activity had for participants and how it might have benefitted their teaching and learning.

Interview Analysis

With the help of student and teacher conversations about classroom experiences and from the philosophical foundations discussed in the first part of this paper, a framework was developed to indicate differences in meanings students and teachers give to their contextual situation. These meanings are suggested in the responses (practical) participants give to the open-ended, choice-oriented, situational-relevant questions used in the interview. The framework is comprised of four regions of meaning surrounding the personal self of an individual.



AREAS OF MEANING (BEING)

Prior to explaining the four areas of being, a word of caution is needed. The concept of meaning within an area of being does not involve any static connotation as though a person had to select one of these areas as a home to live in, to start from or return to. The areas of being are not static, solidified categories but rather flexible, flowing and dialectically intertwining regions of being which involve every one of us. Within a single day, a person may adopt different meanings. There is, furthermore, the problem of enclaves; meaning belonging to one region of being enclosed by another. As the circumstances in a situation change, or are changing, and as the situation changes, the meanings change. As one approaches transcendence, each successive area of being subsumes its outer area of being, and overcomes its perceived obstacles. The framework is outlined below.

Areas of Being

- (a) Passive Area of Being. This area is farthest from a person's inner being. In this instance a person becomes an object for another person. An individual views his relationship with others in terms of patterns of dominance by avoiding the recognition that he is the creator of his own values. Instead, one perceives 'values' as given in the things and institutions of the situation. A person is not, therefore, the source or creator of his own choices, but finds his meanings outside his inner being.
- (b) Immediate Area of Being. In this area a person is only concerned about instants of new pleasure and new experience to fight off boredom. Only the present is of paramount importance. The person takes no responsibility for the choice made. The person is only concerned about his personal pleasurable, satisfying moment.
- (c) Responsible Area of Being. This area is closer to the centre of a person's inner being. A person makes choices and assumes full responsibility for them. A person takes seriously the responsibility of decisiveness and self-determination. He makes his choices with concern for other people's welfare since he realizes other people are affected by his decisions.
- (d) Transcendent Area of Being. This area is nearest to a person's sense of inner being. A person experiences an intensified expression of the visible world. He bases his choices on intuitive and spiritual grounds rather than strictly empirical ones. He prizes such qualities as harmony with his fellow man, social justice and religious ideals.

We are only at the beginning of an interpretive social science evaluation approach. The contribution of existential phenomenology must not be underscored in this enterprise because it allows the evaluator to focus upon the concrete and real everyday life-situation of particular individuals and groups. By employing an existential phenomenological approach the evaluator receives an invaluable amount of information about the individual, within the social world of the classroom.

We firmly believe that more emphasis on a relational evaluation approach to the empirical approach needs to be developed. These frameworks can help us describe social studies programs as experienced within unique situations.

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Chapter IV
EMIC-EVALUATIVE INQUIRY
AS AN APPROACH FOR EVALUATING SCHOOL PROGRAMS

Donald C. Wilson

In recent years discussions concerning the evaluation of social studies have focussed more on technical improvements of existing procedures for assessing student learnings and school programs than on the conceptual issues of evaluation. Studies are needed to clarify the underlying basis of evaluation, to identify neglected areas of inquiry, and to propose alternatives.

One exemplar of an extensive discussion of research practices in social studies education is the article by Shaver and Larkins in The Second Handbook of Research on Teaching (1973) and subsequent articles in response to their article. After indicating some of the problems of using experimental design and statistical techniques in the research and evaluation of social studies programs, Shaver and Larkins posit the need for a broader view of research methodology in order to make efforts in social studies research more fruitful. They suggest ethnography, a field method employed by anthropologists and sociologists, as one alternative method for conducting social studies research. In an examination of the applicability of ethnography for improving research practices, Ferguson (1974) argues that although an ethnographic approach provides a way for collecting data and generating theory, we also must be careful to adopt not only the methodology, but also the purpose of expanding cultural knowledge. Martorella (1974) elucidates some of those factors inherent in the environment that interact with and shape the character of social studies research. Van Manen (1974) pursues further the broader view advocated by Shaver and Larkins. His description of alternative research orientations is a 'meta-level' study of epistemological paradigms for studying man and his social world. Empirical-analytic, interpretive, and critical theories, the three dominant orientations identified by Van Manen, are rooted in Habermas' (1972) "cognitive interests" that guide scientific research and theory development. Each orientation, it is claimed, has its own way of knowing and its own conception of objectivity.

The intent of the chapter is to conceptually examine educational inquiry in order to identify an evaluative approach different from current evaluative practice.

ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK

The matrix in Figure One represents a heuristic model for clarifying the underlying bases of current and alternative ways of investigating educational phenomena. Defined in terms of two dimensions the matrix seeks to expose fundamental assumptions about viewing the social world,

*Paper presented at a CUFA Symposium, Annual Meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies, Cincinnati, Ohio, November 25, 1977.

FIGURE ONE

Matrix Illustrating Types of and Frameworks for Inquiry

		Types of Inquiry	
		Elucidatory I	Evaluative II
Frameworks for Inquiry	Etic A	Etic Elucidatory (A-I Domain)	Etic - Evaluative (A-II Domain)
	Emic B	Emic-Elucidatory (B-I Domain)	Emic - Evaluative (B-II Domain)

modes of understanding, and methods appropriate for understanding and evaluating human activities. The horizontal dimension represents 'types of inquiry' whereas the vertical dimension of the matrix outlines 'frameworks for inquiry.'

Types of Inquiry

The first dimension formulates two types of educational inquiry, based upon Glass's (1972) notions of 'elucidatory' and 'evaluative' inquiry. Elucidatory inquiry is concerned with obtaining generalizable knowledge by testing claims about the relationships among variables. Evaluative inquiry, on the other hand, is the determination of worth of a situation or phenomenon according to particular knowledge.

Elucidatory and evaluative inquiry seek different ends. Glass (1972) contends that elucidatory inquiry is conclusion-oriented whereas evaluative inquiry is decision-oriented. Evaluative inquiry provides information to a client (e.g., curriculum developer) who is committed to solving a particular problem usually concerned with improving an educational program. As such, evaluative inquiry seeks information that describes a particular situation with respect to a certain value stance. In contrast, elucidatory inquiry attempts to satisfy the researcher's curiosity by reaching general conclusions about educational phenomena.

Furthermore, elucidatory and evaluative inquiry differ in the way understanding is viewed. For Glass (1972), elucidatory inquiry strives to establish nomothetic statements that explain human activity. On the other hand, the goal of evaluative inquiry is the judgment of what is good about a particular situation or object. Therefore, according to Glass (1972) evaluative inquiry seeks ideographic accounts (descriptions of the particular) to assist in making decisions; the basis for understanding is the judgment of worth according to descriptions of particular situations.

In terms of method, Glass (1972) views more similarities than differences between the two types of inquiry. Consequently, evaluation uses techniques similar to those used to collect empirical data in elucidatory research.

Frameworks for Inquiry

The second dimension of the matrix outlines two frames of reference coined by Pike (1966) as emic and etic viewpoints for describing human activity.¹ These viewpoints have been used by cultural anthropologists

¹The distinction between emic and etic originates from the words 'phonetic' and 'phonemic' used in conventional social linguistic analysis. Pike (1967) contends that the viewpoints can be used not only to study language but also culture in an analogous manner. A history of the emic/etic tradition in anthropology is discussed by Harris (1976). A framework is an abstraction related to the level of thought with which one is concerned. Consequently, one grasps only certain aspects of the social world that are relevant to the procedural rules and constructs that provide a 'frame of reference' for ascribing meaning to human activity.

to gain an understanding of particular cultural groups. The etic viewpoint is a stance for observing human actions from outside a culture, whereas an emic description is based upon a point of view originating from within a culture. These two viewpoints possess a number of distinguishing characteristics.

First, the viewpoints differ in terms of their foundation. Pike (1967) contends that an etic framework is alien to a particular cultural situation. The etic frame, based on prior broad samplings or cross-cultural studies, is created prior to the study of a situation. On the other hand, emic frames are determined during the examination of the culture. An emic point of view, therefore, is discovered, rather than predetermined.

A second characteristic of the viewpoints is the way in which the frameworks are constructed. Pike (1967) states that an etic frame of reference is a cross-cultural construct created and shared by a community of scholars. On the other hand, the creation of an emic framework flows from within a culture and expresses beliefs, values, and customs of people. An emic viewpoint, then, is discovered within a culture.

A third distinction is the criteria used for description and analysis of a situation. Since etic descriptions are based upon an outsider's point of view, the criteria are external to the situation, whereas an emic account is based upon criteria found within the culture. An etic description, therefore, is more absolute, whereas emic accounts are relative to the cultural situation.

These characteristics of emics and etics as outlined by Pike (1967) establish a form of description either in terms of insiders' or outsiders' accounts of a situation. However, an emic viewpoint premised upon interpretive understanding provides a distinction in knowing the social world.² Whereas an etic viewpoint is premised on an outsider's observation, emic understanding becomes expressed in terms of the insider's intentions. As an actor, man makes choices, sets goals and creates his social world. Moreover, his social nature enables man to exist in an interactive relationship with his social world and with other individuals. Therefore, the concern of emic understanding is for interpretation of a social world that is defined and interpreted by actors in their daily life activities.

Based upon the two dimensions of "types of inquiry" and "frameworks for inquiry," the matrix becomes a focus for conceptualizing an approach to evaluating school programs. Each of the four domains will be considered in terms of three aspects: goal of research, mode of understanding, and method(s) of research.

² Interpretive approaches for subjective understanding of the socio-cultural world are the aim of hermeneutic science. Apple (1974, 1975) contends that interpretive practices presuppose an underlying interest in 'intersubjective' understanding rather than predictions of human activities.

PART A: ETIC - ELUCIDATORY (A-I DOMAIN)

The Goal of Research

The goal of etic-elucidatory research is to derive conclusions about human activities that arise from the researcher's interest in prediction. Results are based upon frameworks external to the study situation. The dominant concern of this form of inquiry is to increase the power of prediction and to control relationships between variables.

Mode of Understanding

In etic-elucidatory research, human activities are understood in terms of nomothetic statements that depict causal relationships between abstracted variables. The only condition for this (A-I Domain) research is for consensual agreement among scientists as to what procedures constitute scientific research and hence which explanations are considered acceptable. In this sense Kuhn (1970) views the procedural agreements as the paradigm of "normal science" that prescribes the process of inquiry. Since the social world is viewed as having no intrinsic meaning, the researcher translates his data into the significant concepts of his discipline or field of study. In turn, these thought constructs provide meaning for his observations. Such a view of understanding implies that each occurring event has a cause, that a difference in effect is a result of a differing cause, and that each cause itself has a prior cause. By controlling and manipulating phenomena, the researcher is able to establish causal links between variables and thus explain and predict social events. Moreover, the adequacy of understanding social phenomena is determined by sensory observation. As the researcher's concepts are tied to sensory data, verification and validation among researchers become possible.

Supported by the limited success of educational research in establishing a nomothetic framework for explaining educational occurrences, some educators are suggesting a 'broader view' of classroom research by utilizing Merton's (1957) notion of "theories of the middle range" to stress theory generation rather than theory verification. These theories are mainly used to stimulate and guide empirical inquiry rather than function as nomothetic statements. A good example is the classroom research of Smith and Geoffrey (1968) who employed anthropological field methods in education. The purpose of this research was to identify major classroom concepts and to establish relationships between concepts so as to generate a general theory of teaching. Another approach to theory generation is Glaser and Strauss' (1967) notion of grounded theory. They contend that theory should be generated from data of actual situations rather than from a priori assumptions. Comparative analysis is the general method advocated for generating theory. In other words, data comparison of actual situations enables the researcher to generate theories with various levels of generality. Moreover, Lutz and Ramsey argue that theory generation is a "distinct mode of scientific thought" and a "parallel way of acquiring knowledge"(1974:6) to that of the hypothesis testing and statistical analysis often used in educational research.

Although the theory generation approaches of anthropological field

methods and grounded theory acknowledge close association with the socio-cultural world, the frame of reference does not acknowledge the socially constructed order of the situation being studied. The concern for understanding simply shifts the emphasis of inquiry from that of verification of nomothetic statements to the confirmation of low level statements of relationships or to the generation of theoretical propositions. The view does not achieve an epistemological stance different from the conventional research found in contemporary educational and evaluative literature.

Furthermore, etic-elucidatory inquiry views reality as a natural, objective world. This view of reality is grounded in a number of meta-physical assumptions concerning the nature of phenomena which are being observed: first, that the natural world does not possess intrinsic meaning structures; second, that the objective world, external to the researcher, has an independent existence of its own.

Etic-elucidatory research views the classroom as a natural world. This orientation is reflected in Jackson's (1968) efforts of observation and note-taking while in an elementary classroom. Although contending that "we must move up close to the phenomena of the teacher's world" (Jackson, 1968:159), the research would appear to provide a naturalistic account of daily life. Classroom life is accepted as it is observed. The nature of daily experience is not questioned.

Methods of research

The methods employed by the etic-elucidatory domain of research include a wide range of techniques and procedures. Supported by procedural rules embedded in the researcher's frame of reference, methods strive to maintain a high degree of scientific rigor and precision. Such qualities are best achieved by quasi-experimental designs and statistical techniques.

Recent concerns for process-oriented studies have somewhat altered procedures characteristic of this domain. For instance, classroom interaction systems, as etic frameworks, provide frequency information of classroom interactions for the purpose of identifying relationships. The utilization of anthropological field methods in educational research, as suggested by Lutz and Ramsey (1974), places greater emphasis on observing the action of a cultural situation. These methods are objective techniques that collect data about actions and experiences of people for the purpose of gaining explanatory power of human activities.

PART 3: ETIC - EVALUATIVE (A-II DOMAIN)

Goal of Research

The aim of etic-evaluative inquiry is to resolve practical issues based upon information of a particular situation. The identification of a problem, its solution, and the sense of worth are part of a frame of reference external to the situation that is defined by the evaluator

and/or his client. The purpose of evaluative inquiry, then, is to prescribe procedures that will solve an 'outsider's' problem defined either in advance or during the evaluation activities.

Mode of Understanding

In etic-evaluative inquiry, programs or situations are understood in terms of descriptions of particular events rather than in reference to nomothetic statements. Such understanding aids evaluators (decision-makers) in judging the viability of a solution or the worthiness of an educational program. To gain understanding, evaluative practice defines a problem, collects information of human activities, and judges the worth of programs based on a frame of reference independent of the situation being evaluated. In other words, etic-evaluative inquiry presupposes a situation to be a natural world without subjective meaning.

A second condition for understanding is that evaluative practice adopts a linear process of inquiry. Tasks such as selecting appropriate information, utilizing discrepancy data, and making judgments stress a process which has both a discrete beginning and an end. Determining the problem or need is the starting point, whereas the judging of decision alternatives, identifying program weaknesses or illustrating program efficiency is the end result. By focusing on aspects of procedural sequencing, the process of inquiry stresses operational matters that can be prescribed in a definition, a model, or a design for evaluation.

Methods of Research

In most cases, evaluators utilize those methods employed in elucidatory inquiry. However, the selection of methods may vary depending upon the notion of the evaluation. If evaluation is equated with measurement, then there will be typically an emphasis upon quasi-experimental designs and statistical techniques. If concern is for process evaluation, then observation, interviewing, sampling or survey methods may be employed. For example, Smith and Pohland (1974) related how they employed participant observation techniques, interviews, and questionnaires to collect evaluative information on a computer-assisted instruction program in mathematics. Rosenshine (1970) outlines how classroom interaction systems can provide evaluative information for the modification of instructional programs. Moreover, the models of evaluation by Stake (1972) and others, provide a more generalized framework of procedural steps for conducting evaluative practice.

The increasing recognition for process, evaluation and the criticism of comparative evaluative practices (Walker and Schaffarzick, 1974) has resulted in methods of evaluation becoming more concerned with identifying areas of improvement in a program. Although current evaluative practices and prescriptions have urged greater use of observation and survey methods, the concern for objective knowing continues to be taken-for-granted. Despite the increasing range of methods used by evaluators, etic-evaluative research continues to reflect an epistemological stance similar to etic-elucidatory inquiry.

PART C: EMIC-ELUCIDATORY (B - I DOMAIN)

Goal of Research

The aim of emic-elucidatory research is to understand the world of everyday life in terms of the actor's or insider's point of view. Such an understanding is based upon the interpretation of meaning structures that exist within the daily life activities of people rather than upon the causal relationships of concepts of a discipline or field of study. Emic-elucidatory inquiry recognizes the subjective meaning structures or shared social rules that exist within the reality of everyday life. In order to elucidate the subjective meaning of the social world, research becomes both descriptive and interpretive. In other words, descriptions become interpretive in that they refer to the meaning individuals themselves give to their own actions.

Mode of Understanding

In emic-elucidatory research understanding becomes based upon the actor's view of his socio-cultural situation rather than in terms of a framework selected by a researcher in order to give his interpretation of human actions. Meaning is not founded, therefore, on sensory observation of human action (as is the case with naturalistic accounts), but instead, predicated on the intentionality of actors in daily life situations.

Although philosophers and historians such as Dilthey, Hegel, Simmel and Husserl have provided a discourse of interpretive understanding, the more current influence on interpretive inquiry has been the thinking of Weber (1949). His formulation of 'verstehen' as a method which recognized human consciousness is generic to contemporary socio-cultural research. Although 'verstehen' has been misunderstood by its critics and abused by its practitioners, such methodological recognition for the actor's meaning has established a point of departure for additional conceptions of interpretive understanding. Two examples of emic elucidatory understanding are the conceptions of social phenomenology (Schutz, 1967, 1971) and of cultural anthropology (Geertz, 1973).

The social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz postulates understanding of the social world in terms of the meaning structures socially constructed and shared by people. Rather than view emic understanding solely as a methodological device for gaining access to a socially constructed world (as is Weber's view), Schutz considers "understanding" as a typification or expression for representing the actual way in which people interpret their own and other people's actions. His conceptualization of the meaning structures of individuals is an attempt to provide a basis for systematic inquiry of a socially constructed world.

The basic notion underlying Schutz's (1971) conception of the social world is the reality of the common-sense world or everyday life. For Schutz, such a reality which is not questioned by conventional social science research, holds the key to emic understanding. Each individual exists as a participant in daily life activities and shares with others a world of communication, work and life. Although the cultural and

historical forms of common-sense reality are shared by all, the way in which these forms are translated into daily life depends upon the totality of a person's experience. An individual defines reality according to his own biographical situation and strives to dominate or effect change on the common-sense world.

As an exemplar of emic-elucidatory research, Schutz's conceptualization of every day common-sense reality heightens our understanding of a process that creates a socially constructed world. The mode of understanding, therefore, is tied to a theory of social action that is based upon a pretheoretical notion (first-order constructs) of the social world rather than an empirical analytic framework (second-order constructs).

The work of Geertz (1973) in cultural anthropology also reflects Weber's notion of interpretive understanding based upon subjective meaning structures. Geertz (1973:30) posits that cultural analysis must be closely tied "to concrete social events and occasions" or "the public world of common life." For this reason he suggests an interpretive theory of culture requires a semiotic definition and an interpretive approach for ethnography.

Rather than base a definition of culture entirely on the many diffused views of culture, Geertz espouses a conception of culture that is similar to the thinking of Max Weber. Geertz (1973:5) states:

Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.

Moreover, Geertz (1973:24) contends that the whole point of a semiotic approach to culture is "to aid us in gaining access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense of the term, converse with them." Culture cannot causally explain social events, institutions and processes, but it can provide a context within which the social phenomena can be 'thickly' described and thus, understood. In other words, an interpretive approach seeks to uncover the actor's interpretive framework and provide description in terms of those meaning structures.

Emic-elucidatory inquiry presupposes that man constructs his social world rather than discovers a reality which in some way is a fixed external entity. The relationship between an individual and his social world is viewed as a dialectic process in which society, as a human product, continuously acts upon its producer. In this context, reality becomes a product of man's subjective ordering of the objective world. This world is available to him through the meanings which are assigned to it by his society.

Methods of Research

Methods of emic-elucidatory inquiry have not received the same degree

of attention as have the techniques of etic-elucidatory research. At the conceptual level, the efforts of Weber, Schutz and Geertz provides significant methodological frameworks for investigating the subjective meaning structures of the social world. At the more practical level, Cicourel (1964) outlines ways of utilizing participant observation, interviews and content analysis, without reducing social actions to a set of psychological variables that take-for-granted the social world. Although early efforts of anthropologists with participant observation practices were directed toward describing activities of isolated tribal groups, more recent efforts are directed towards ethnographic accounts of contemporary society. This interest in obtaining ethnographies of cultural situations has fostered anthropological methods to emphasize a number of approaches such as ethno-science (Sturtevant, 1972) and interpretive ethnography. In highly selected situations, Garfinkel (1967) has conducted ethnomethodological studies to determine the processes people use to give meaning to social phenomena. Many of these methods acknowledge the existence of the common-sense constructs of daily life.

PART D: EMIC-EVALUATIVE (B - II DOMAIN)

Goal of Research

The major aim of emic-evaluative inquiry is to gain a common-sense understanding of an 'insiders' view that reflects the worth of a situation in terms of the quality of life. Although the concern is 'foreshadowed' by the theoretic constructs of social phenomenology, the nature of the concern becomes clarified through the interpretive understanding of daily life. The intention of emic-evaluative inquiry therefore, is to serve the interests of those people who experience a school program rather than be concerned with 'outsiders' who desire to monitor the effects of a particular program upon students. Instead of controlling students' learnings the aim of inquiry is to allow individuals involved in school programs to become more autonomous and capable of realizing their own potentialities as human beings.

Mode of Understanding

In emic-evaluative inquiry, the mode of understanding is based upon a process of reflection in which the evaluator questions the significance of daily life activities. Inquiry becomes an ongoing examination of both the daily life activities of a situation and the approach for conducting evaluation.

An investigation of the reality of daily life presupposes that subjective understanding originates with the thoughts and actions of insiders who seek to order daily events and encounters with others. Descriptions of these social meanings, however, are considered evaluative in that they express the worth individuals give to daily events and occurrences. As is the case with emic-elucidatory inquiry, social actions and not social structures become the basis for understanding human activities.

An individual's interpretations are derived from previous experiences, either his own or those handed down by parents, teachers and others. Such

experience provides knowledge that has a practical rather than a theoretical interest. That is, in everyday life an individual who is pragmatically motivated seeks "not the whole truth but merely 'cook-book' knowledge sufficient to give (him) practical mastery of the immediate activities in which (he is) involved." (Silberman, 1972:167). An individual thus views the social world as an ordered reality in which his actions become rational in terms of their adequacy for attaining his day to day interests. Moreover, Shutz (1967, 1971) contends that aspects of an individual's life world are viewed as being mutually related. The intersubjective character of common-sense thought assumes the inherent sociality of consciousness, and individual experience of everyday life as being a shared reality.

For decades, sociologists and educators have used the notion of interaction as a means of understanding human activities. Various kinds of interaction research share a common belief that the activities within a particular situation represent the focus of study. Although there are conflicting views on the ways in which to examine daily occurrences, there are also attempts to clarify how the constructs of interaction may be viewed.

Emic-evaluative inquiry views human interaction phenomenologically as a process of constructed courses-of-action by involved individuals. Social interaction, therefore, is dependent upon the ideal forms of 'patterns of action' and 'understanding the other.' The term 'action' which refers to 'human conduct based upon a preconceived project' can be either overt or covert in nature (Shutz, 1967).

The starting point of understanding, therefore, is not the ongoing process of action itself, but the individual's projection of the act being accomplished. Furthermore, an individual's 'pattern of action' becomes based on two kinds of motives which are the source of his projection. An 'in-order-to motive' guides action that brings about a certain state of affairs in the future. An individual who focuses on the on-going process of interaction recognizes an 'in-order-to motive.' Action in this case becomes goal oriented rather than causal in nature. A second kind of motive is the 'because motive' that reflects the actor's view of his past experiences which have derived his course of action. The 'because motive' that caused him to do what he did can only be understood by himself (and others) from a reflective stance.

Consequently, the evaluator employs a 'way of looking' that differs from the linear process of inquiry of etic-evaluation practice. By adopting a reflective process emic-evaluative inquiry involves not only examination of those assumptions associated with the evaluative practices, but also the investigation of the underlying social order of daily life. Schutz (1973) has compared the reflective understanding of a social order to the experience of a 'stranger' in an alien community. For example, in order to understand and become part of a classroom the evaluator views occurrences which students and teachers do not question. His goal for becoming a part of the constructed social order requires reflection and reinterpretation of the daily life that is shared with his consociates (students and teachers). As a result the evaluator does not simply discover the social world, but instead internalizes the social order that provides meaning to the daily activities. Emic-evaluative information, then, becomes the product of his experiences as an evaluator. The

evaluator's understanding of the situation becomes clarified by means of a social relationship in which the evaluator and consociates do not merely observe each other, but in which they engage in dialogue to affect each other.

By acknowledging the existence of subjective meaning structures, an evaluative approach must be responsive to the activities of the reality of life rather than to an 'outsider's' frame of reference. Such responsiveness requires a validating process between the evaluator and consociates who strive to develop a joint understanding of the situation. Thus, the evaluators and the individuals of a situation become co-evaluators through a process of reflective inquiry.

Methods of Research

The concern for methodology in emic-evaluative inquiry is not the imposition of a set of prescribed procedures, but rather, what Schatzman and Strauss (1973) refer to as a philosophical mandate for rendering possible the relationship between evaluator, the investigation and the actors of the social situation. A reflective stance enables the evaluator to treat these concerns as problematic.

Since the intentional self is assumed to be the source of meaning, emic-evaluative inquiry takes the common-sense constructs of daily life worlds as being the topic for investigation. In attempting to understand a social situation from the actor's point of view, methods should allow individuals to reflect on the activities of the program being evaluated and on the experiences arising from the dialogue between evaluator and actor.

In anthropology and sociology, a range of methods exists for documenting daily activities of a particular situation. The method of participant observation has been used for decades by anthropologists to obtain ethnographic descriptions of cultural groups. Such descriptions attempted to identify the cultural knowledge shared by people. Much of the earlier field work, which relied on the investigator being a participant observer, failed to outline issues of method or to clarify a socially constructed world. The major criterion of research was that of a lengthy immersion within the culture group being investigated. However, participant observation practices have been used in education by Keddie (1971) to gain an account of socially constructed classroom knowledge, by Cusick (1973) to describe life in a high school from an insider's view, and by Wilson (1976) to evaluate a social studies program in terms of an emic viewpoint. In the latter case, participant observation provided an opportunity for the evaluator to participate in and log the daily activities of the program. As the major concern of emic-evaluative inquiry is not the substantive aspects of the program but more the quality of class activities, descriptions of the 'program-in-use' provide a basis for uncovering the subjective meanings of daily events. Two procedures that can assist in the questioning of daily events are interviews and approaches of ethnomethodology.

Often, interviews are concerned with the use of standardized, pre-determined questions, and a detached role for the interviewer. However, if everyday life is to be the topic of study, then the interview itself

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must be considered a social encounter in which the involved individuals seek common-sense knowledge of social interaction. This results in a complex role for the interviewer. Not only does the researcher have to convey a sincere attitude during the interview, but he must also interpret the respondent's point of view. One interview procedure that can acknowledge the actor's frame of reference is 'elite' interviewing introduced by Dexter (1970). It involves interviewing an individual in a special non-standardized manner. In other words, the interviewer lets the respondent convey his problem and related questions and judgments. The respondent's comments are always interpreted in terms of his social position, frame of reference, purposes and biases.

A second method appropriate for emic understanding is ethnomethodology which provides a probing examination of daily life. The approach suggests the use of 'documentary interpretation' and 'disturbances' (demonstration experiments) for making visible the ethnomethods or practical reasons for what people do in their daily lives. The procedure of documentary interpretation identifies the daily language used to type actions and the way meaning is ascribed to social phenomena. The purpose of the procedure is to uncover an underlying pattern based upon a series of appearances that in turn become 'documents of.' The notion of creating 'disturbances' is to reveal the common-sense ideas about the processes that make the social world objective. Garfinkel (1967) argues that by making trouble (breaking a rule) in a presumably non-problematic situation, a researcher comes to know how members conduct their practical activities.

In emic-evaluative inquiry, methods are selected according to their acknowledgement of a social world. Their applicability is not dependent on a prescription of technique but rather the ability of methods to describe and interpret the common-sense constructs indicative of the insider's concern for quality of life. Since methods become influenced by the continuous re-examination of the evaluator's experience, the use of methods themselves becomes a social activity for investigation. In the process of emic-evaluative inquiry the examination of the experience and understanding which the researcher comes to share with his subjects is of a greater importance than following a step-by-step procedure premised upon a model or design of evaluation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the paper is a conceptual exploration of approaches for evaluating school programs. The examination of conventional evaluations reveals a linear process of inquiry which is taken-for-granted in evaluating particular programs. In contrast, emic-evaluative inquiry views the situation as being socially constructed with subjective meanings that suggest the worth of human activities in terms of the quality of life. In order to understand this common-sense world of daily life, emic-evaluative inquiry adopts a reflective process in which the socially constructed nature of the situation and the process of inquiry are treated problematically by the evaluator. Such a process provides evaluative practice with a form of inquiry that can assist participants of a school program in becoming more directly involved with fostering improvements in education.

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